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Tripping the Rift: Navigating

Judicial Speech Fault Lines
in the Post-White Landscape
by Barbara E. Reed*
This Article is presented in large part as a synthesis of existing
jurisprudence, conventional public policy wisdom, and new approaches
to navigating the post-White landscape, including recommendations
derived from years of collaboration with judges, lawyers, scholars, policy
specialists, and other stakeholders. To a greater or lesser degree, much
of what is contained herein is thus subjective and should be approached
with that in mind. The views herein, and any errors, are mine alone.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Two and a half years after the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,' the status of the conduct
rules governing the third branch remains unstable. It is tempting to
regard the White decision as a catastrophe of constitutional proportions-as, indeed, a large percentage of scholars, advocates, and
members of the bench do.

Judicial independence consultant; principal of Ajijaak Consulting, Inc. Michigan
State University (B.A., 1993); Hofstra University School of Law (J.D., 1997). Member,
State Bar of New York.
This Article is presented as a part of the Fifth Annual Georgia Symposium on
Professionalism, hosted by the Walter F. George School of Law. I wish to extend my
appreciation to the administration and faculty of the law school for inviting me to
participate in this year's Symposium, "Judicial Professionalism in a New Era of Judicial
Selection." Particular thanks are owed to Patrick E. Longan, Director of the Mercer Center
for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, for his efforts in coordinating this event. I am also
grateful to the student staff of the Mercer Law Review, particularly Lead Articles Editor
Darcy Jones, for their assistance with the Symposium and with the publication of this
Article.
1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
*
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In truth, however, White is better regarded as a relatively small
seismic event: one that, despite the force of the initial quake, has now
subsided into a constitutional and ethical fault line. The jurisprudence
of judicial speech and conduct (especially, although not exclusively, with
regard to judicial elections) may now reasonably be divided into
categories on either side of the White fault: (1) what may be described
as the "say nothing" tradition; and (2) what may be termed the new "say
anything" practice. Judges and judicial candidates today straddle this
line under tremendous pressure from both sides, each of which risks
hardening into an all-or-nothing approach that jeopardizes the judiciary's independence and ability to perform its constitutional functions.
However, there is another post-White path: A combination of narrow
tailoring, a commitment by the bench and bar to the highest aspirational
standards, and an assertive campaign of public education, can create a
jurisprudence that is sufficiently flexible to expand and contract as
required by individual circumstances and constitutional requirements.
Such a jurisprudence will prevent what is now a manageable rift from
rupturing into an unbreachable chasm.
Under this analysis, White may be regarded not as a catastrophe, but
rather as an opportunity, and this Article makes the case for such an
approach. Part I outlines early judicial-speech jurisprudence and traces
the path of these early tremors to White. Part II dissects White itself,
clarifying precisely what the decision holds, and debunking the toxic
mythology that has grown up around it. Part III covers post-White
developments and lays the groundwork for Part IV, which uses judicial
candidate questionnaires as a vehicle to demonstrate how White's impact
may be transformed into an educational opportunity: how, contrary to
popular belief, changes in judicial speech standards may be used not to
undermine judicial independence, but rather to build a stronger, more
independent judiciary. Such an approach will not be easy, but it will be
necessary to preserve a judiciary that is authoritative, autonomous, and
accountable in a manner envisioned by our constitutional tradition.
II.

PART I: EARLY TREMORS

The American Bar Association ("ABA") first promulgated its contemporary Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2 ("Model Code") in 1972. As with
the ABA's other "model" rules and codes, this Model Code was designed

2.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972). The ABA's earliest effort in this area

was its Canons of JudicialEthics of 1924. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924), reprinted
in 9 A.B.A.J. 449 (Jan. 1923). However, the Model Code first appeared in its modern
iteration in 1972.
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as a template that state judiciaries could adapt to create their own rules
governing judicial speech and conduct, both on and off the bench.
This initial version of the Model Code included the now-infamous
"announce clause" of what was then Canon 7,3 under which judges and
judicial candidates were not permitted to "announce their views on
disputed legal or political issues."4 Although well-intentioned, the
"announce clause" paved the road to today's First Amendment hell in the
context of judicial elections. The clause was originally intended to
prevent either an actual or an apparent quid pro quo of votes for
decisional outcomes. A subsidiary goal was to provide elected judges
with a prophylactic against such improper pressures to issue particular
decisions.
However, it eventually became apparent that the "announce clause"
suffered from those dreaded dual constitutional infirmities of overbreadth and vagueness: The phrase "disputed legal or political issues"
was overly broad because it had the potential to ensnare remarks by
judges and judicial candidates on topics that could not possibly come
before them on the bench. 5 The same flaws responsible for the canon's
overbreadth likewise rendered it vague, appearing to encompass
everything generally but nothing specifically. Thus, in 1990, the ABA
revised the Model Code, scrapping Canon 7's "announce clause" in favor
of relying upon the speech restrictions of Canon 5,6 including the socalled "commit clause" and "pledges or promises clause."7 Certainly,

3. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c). Canon 7 provides: "Ajudge
or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity." The 1990 version
of the Model Code relied upon the language of Canon 5: "A judge should refrain from
political activity inappropriate to his judicial office." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
(1990).
4.

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).

5. Id.
6. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(i-ii) (1990), which reads, in
relevant part:
A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political
Activity
(3) A candidate for a judicial office: ...
(d) shall not: ...
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and
impartial performance of the duties of the office;
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court.
7. This Article uses either term, according to the variation used by the jurisdiction or
case under discussion. The post-White revisions to the Model Code have combined the two
to read, in relevant part:
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from 1990 until 2001, no one seriously entertained the idea that a ban
on such pledges, promises, or "commitments" would run afoul of the
Constitution. During this period, major challenges mounted to such
restrictions on judicial speech and conduct were few and far between-so
few, in fact, that in practical terms, the most significant case law
amounts to three decisions, one from the Michigan Supreme Court and
two from the federal courts: Buckley v.Illinois JudicialInquiry Board,'
In re Chmura,9 and Butler v. Alabama JudicialInquiry Commission."°
A.

Buckley v. Illinois JudicialInquiry Board

Buckley v.Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board,1 a 1993 Seventh Circuit
decision, turned on facts that now seem quaint by comparison with
White and its progeny. Incumbent appellate court judge Robert Buckley,
eligible for retention, simultaneously ran for a slot on the Illinois
Supreme Court. 2 During the course of his campaign, he distributed
literature that included the statement that, as an appellate court justice,
13
he had "never written an opinion reversing a rape conviction."
Buckley subsequently faced charges before the state judicial disciplinary
body, the Illinois Courts Commission ("ICC"), for violating the "announce
clause" of the Illinois Code of Judicial Conduct.14 The ICC found a
violation, but declined to impose any sanction. In the meantime,
Buckley lost the race for Illinois Supreme Court, but won retention to his
position on the appellate court. 5
Buckley filed suit in federal district court, and his case was consolidated with that of Anthony Young, a lawyer and former state legislator who
had just won a circuit court race.' s Young's suit alleged that the
''announce clause" had prevented him from discussing issues that were

A Judge or Judicial Candidate Shall Refrain from Inappropriate Political
Activity
A. All Judges and Candidates...
(3) A candidate* for a judicial office: ...
(d) shall not:
(i) with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before
the court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the
impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of the office ....
8. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
9. 626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001).
10. 802 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2001).
11. 997 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1993).
12. Id. at 225-26.
13. Id. at 226.
14. ILL. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2000), reprinted in ILL. COMP. STAT. (2000).
15. See In re Buckley, 3 Ill. Cts. Comm'n 1 (1991).
16. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 226.
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"important" to Illinois voters in choosing their circuit court judges,
including abortion, capital punishment, public education issues, and the
state's budget. 1 7 There was a material difference in the two cases,
however: As an incumbent judge, Buckley was subject to the sole
jurisdiction and discretion of the ICC, from whose decision there was no
appeal. Young, on the other hand, was not yet a judge when he ran for
circuit court; had he violated the "announce clause," he would have been
disciplined under the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility" for
lawyers, and would thus have had a right of appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court.' 9
Buckley sought only to challenge the constitutionality of the ICC's
decision, rather than a ruling on the merits of his campaign statement.
The district court thus construed the "announce clause" narrowly: as
applicable only to issues that were likely to come before the judge in
question.2" On that basis, the district court dismissed the suit, and
Buckley appealed to the Seventh Circuit. 1
Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Richard Posner acknowledged
that "judges remain different from legislators and executive officials,
even when all are elected, in ways that bear on the strength of the
state's interest in restricting their freedom of speech.""
However,
Posner nonetheless found the rule unconstitutional on grounds that both
its "announce clause" and its "pledges or promises clause" were
overinclusive: 2"
The "announce clause" could not reasonably be
construed to apply only to cases or controversies likely to come before the
court,'4 and the "pledges or promises clause" extended to pledges and
promises for all purposes, not merely to reach particular decisions.'
B.

In re Chmura

In re Chmura6 was a 2001 case from Michigan, stemming from a
1996 judicial election in Macomb County, a Detroit suburb. Almost as
little-noticed as Buckley at the time, Chmura nevertheless eerily
foreshadowed White and its progeny. Although the "announce clause"
remained on the books in some states, Michigan was not among them.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

See Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 801 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. 111. 1992).
See supra note 16.
Buckley, 997 F.2d at 226.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 228, 230.
Id. at 228.
See id. at 229.
626 N.W.2d 876 (Mich. 2001).
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Chmura engaged in highly negative campaign advertising, mounting
vicious, misleading, and otherwise inappropriate attacks upon his
opponent, the incumbent trial judge." Among his campaign advertising was a television commercial that included the following on-screen
text: "Murder ... Rape ... Dismemberment.. . Innocent Victims ...
Could Jim Conrad's Court have stopped it?"2" The ad also accused
Conrad of having sentenced the defendant in the case at issue to "only
a slap on the wrist."29
Not content with running ads attacking his opponent, Chmura also
mounted a tangential attack on Coleman Young, then the highly
controversial mayor of Detroit, in a blatant attempt to boost his
3°
candidacy through an appeal to the baser reactions of the electorate.
Macomb County is a largely white, reliably conservative district, and one
of the counties whose population exploded during the years of "white
flight" from the city of Detroit.3 ' At the time of the 1990 census,
Macomb County's demographics were 97% white, 1% African-American,
1% Asian-American, and 1% a combination of all other ethnic categories.32 Fairly or unfairly, the county's reputation in the state was one
that was regarded as unwelcoming, to say the least, to people of color
and immigrants.
Chmura attempted to capitalize on local hatred of Young by distributing a campaign flier showing a caricature of Young in a "Robin Hood"
costume. 3 The depiction of Young's face was an exaggerated stereotype
of supposedly "African-American" features. The flier was objectionable
on two other levels: First, it exploited a controversial political debate
over a legislative- and executive-branch tax plan, accusing Young of
robbing the people of Macomb County of tax dollars to pay for Detroit
spending, despite the fact that as a mayor, Young had no role in or
control over the legislation in question. Second, the text implied that,
if elected, Chmura would be in a position to "do something about it,"
namely, by preventing Young from "robbing" Macomb County taxpay-

27. See id. at 884.
28. Id. at 891.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 888-91.
31. See generally, e.g., STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE POLITICS
AND POWER OF THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORITY (Times Books 1995).
32. See, e.g., Southeastern Michigan Council of Gov'ts. (SEMCOG), Community Profile
for Macomb County: Population by Race and Hispanic Origin, at http://www.semcog.org
(2004). By the 2000 census, Macomb County's white population had dropped to a mere
93%, while the African-American population had jumped to 3%.
33. In re Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 888.
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ers-an implication that could only charitably be described as misleading, since Chmura would have no occasion to preside over such a case.34
At that time, Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of Michigan's Canons of Judicial
Conduct35 prohibited judicial candidates from engaging in misleading
or inaccurate advertising. 36 The Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission
("JTC") leveled four charges against Chmura. A master3 7 appointed by
the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the canon was both overbroad
and void for vagueness.3" Instead of upholding either of the usual
standards that had customarily been applied in such cases (i.e., either
that strict scrutiny was satisfied because the canon was narrowly
tailored to preserve the state's compelling interest in protecting judicial
independence, or that a lesser standard applied that did not demand
strict scrutiny), the master instead substituted the standard used in
defamation cases: "actual malice." 39 Ruling that the state "should
restrict only public communications that are false or made with reckless
disregard for their truth or falsity," the master recommended that the
JTC dismiss the charges and invalidate the canon.40
The JTC rejected the master's findings.4 1 Construing Canon 7(B)(1)(d) in a more traditional manner, the JTC held that it was neither
overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague because it "only applied when a
judicial candidate 'has knowledge [that] a communication is false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive.' ' 42 The JTC justified its recommendation that Chmura be suspended for ninety days without pay on
the grounds that, "individually and as a whole, [the advertisements]

34.

Id.

35.

MICH. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1999).

36. The version of Canon 7(B)(1)(d) in effect at that time read, in relevant part:
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office: ...
(d) should not use or participate in the use of any form of public communication
that the candidate knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or
law or omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a whole not
materially misleading, or which is likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results the candidate can achieve.
See supra note 35, Canon 7(B)(1)(d); Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 880-81.
37. Michigan's judicial disciplinary procedures were multi-layered: Once charges were
filed with the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission ("JTC"), the Michigan Supreme Court
could appoint a master to make findings of fact and issue recommendations to the JTC.
The JTC could accept or reject the master's findings. Judges sanctioned by the JTC could
appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
38. Chmura, 626 N.W.2d at 880-81.
39. Id. at 881.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 881-82.
42. Id.
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revealed a 'conscious effort to use false, fraudulent, misleading, 43and
deceptive statements as part and parcel of his campaign strategy.'
Chmura appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which accepted his
argument that, in finding against him and recommending suspension,
the JTC had violated his First Amendment rights." The court held
that the First Amendment bars sanctions against judicial candidates for
making statements that fall into three categories: (1) literally true but
misleading; (2) "substantially true" but misleading; and (3) "mere
rhetorical hyperbole" that is misleading.45 Endorsing the recommendation of the master, the court held that the only legitimate grounds for
disciplining a judicial candidate for false campaign statements are those
that satisfy the "actual malice" standard: false statements made
knowingly, or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.46
C.

Butler v.Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission

In Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission,47 during Ala-

bama's 2000 judicial elections, incumbent Alabama Supreme Court
Justice Harold See ran against challenger Roy Moore 41 for the Chief
Justice's slot. See, who had himself been the target of a particularly
nasty ad campaign during the 1996 election, was charged by the
Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission ("JIC") with violating the state's

43. Id. at 884.
44. See id. at 897.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 802 So. 2d 201 (Ala. 2001).
48. In one of life's little ironies, Moore himself would undergo the disciplinary process
for engaging in questionable conduct. As a trial judge, Moore fought to keep a replica of
the Decalogue posted on his bench in the courtroom; during the race for Chief Justice, he
campaigned as the "Ten Commandments Judge," regularly making inappropriate public
statements with regard to cases that were likely to come before the court. After winning
the Chief Justice's position, under cover of night and with no notice to his colleagues, he
installed a two-and-a-half-ton granite monument of the Decalogue in the main rotunda of
the Alabama Supreme Court. He fought attempts, on grounds that its presence violated
the Separation Clause, to have it removed, repeatedly engaging in inappropriate public
commentary. The American Civil Liberties Union of Alabama sued in federal district court
to compel the monument's removal; the judge held that the First Amendment required that
the monument be removed, and issued an order compelling Moore both to remove the
monument and to pay for all associated costs. Moore repeatedly refused to comply with
the federal district court's order, publicly asserting that his responsibility to "God's law"
trumped any such duties to U.S. law. Because of his willful refusal to comply with the law,
he was suspended pending disciplinary proceedings and ultimately removed from the
bench. See generally Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003).
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canons of judicial conduct for campaign activities arising out of the race
against Moore.49
The JIC instituted proceedings against See in the Alabama Court of
the Judiciary ("COJ"). The charges fell into three major categories: (1)
making campaign statements that were knowingly false or made with
reckless disregard for their truth or falsity; (2) making campaign
statements that were knowingly deceptive and/or misleading; and (3)
undermining the integrity of and public confidence in the judiciary 0
Alabama canons at issue were Canon 2(A) 1 and Canon
The two
7(B)(2). 5
Canon 2(A)53 was what may be called a "baseline" canon, examples
of which are found in one form or another in virtually all jurisdictions.
Such canons are designed to hold judges to high standards of conduct
even where there may be no affirmative duty of or explicit prohibition
on certain types of behavior. Canon 2(A) provided: "A judge should
respect and comply with the law and should conduct himself at all times
in a manner that promotes5 4public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary."
Canon 7(B)(2) was an explicit prohibition on the distribution, either
knowingly or recklessly, of false or misleading information about an
opponent.55 The prohibition extended to "true information about a
judicial candidate or an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading
to a reasonable person."5 6
State law provided for automatic suspension of any judge involved in
disciplinary proceedings until the COJ issued a decision. Unwilling to
wait for the COJ to rule, See filed suit in federal district court seeking
a temporary restraining order ("TRO") enjoining enforcement of the

See Butler, 802 So. 2d at 210.
Id. at 211.
ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2(A) (2004).
ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7(B)(2) (2004).
See supra note 51.
ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 2(A) (2004).
See supra note 52. The text of Canon 7(B)(2) reads, in relevant part:
Campaign Communications. During the course of any campaign for nomination
or election to judicial office, a candidate shall not, by any means, do any of the
following:
Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute false information
concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to
be false or with reckless disregard of whether the information is false; or post,
publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute true information about a
judicial candidate or an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a
reasonable person.
56. See supra note 51.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
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suspension, on grounds that the suspension, the COJ proceedings, and
even the JIC's charges themselves all constituted violations of his First
Amendment rights. The district court agreed and issued the TRO,
putting See back on the bench.57
The JIC appealed the TRO to the Eleventh Circuit. By the time the
Eleventh Circuit considered the appeal, the election was over and See
had lost the Chief Justice's position to Roy Moore, but remained on the
Court as an associate justice. The nine-member Alabama Supreme
Court thus included two members whose status was clouded by ethical
questions.5" Against this backdrop, the Eleventh Circuit punted:
Instead of addressing the appeal head-on, it certified three questions59
to the Alabama Supreme Court on grounds that the questions involved
state law that only the state body could interpret.6 ° Thus, two of the
members of the body interpreting the certified questions had a vested
and immediate interest in the outcome.
The court finally issued an answer to the Eleventh Circuit: It
determined that two of the questions were moot and declined altogether
to answer the third, 1 but did manage to hold that the canons of
judicial conduct in question amounted to an unconstitutional infringement of the First Amendment.62 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, vacating
the preliminary injunction granted by the federal district court and
remanding the case for dismissal.63
The Alabama Supreme Court held that Canon 7(B)(2) was facially
unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds." The court conceded that

57.
58.
59.

Butler, 802 So. 2d at 211.
Id. at 212.
The certified questions were as follows:
A. In a proceeding before the Alabama Court of the Judiciary, can a defendant
raise and have decided a constitutional challenge to a judicial canon, either at the
Court of the Judiciary or through direct review to the Supreme Court or by other
means?
B. If so, how do the procedural rules governing the Court of the Judiciary permit
a reasonably speedy decision on federal constitutional issues?
C. In a proceeding before the Alabama Court of the Judiciary, can that court or
a higher court grant, in that proceeding, a stay of the judge's disqualification
pending the outcome of that proceedings or the outcome of the federal constitutional challenge posed in that proceeding?
Id. (quoting Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1265-66 (11th Cir.
2001)).
60. Butler, 802 So. 2d at 212.
61. Id. at 213.
62. Id. at 215, 219.
63. Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 261 F.3d 1154, 1160 (2001).
64. Butler, 802 So. 2d at 215.
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the state of Alabama appeared to have a compelling interest in
protecting the judiciary's integrity, but flatly rejected the JIC's argument
that the canons in question were narrowly tailored to fulfill that
interest, compelling or not.6 5 It held that the last clause of Canon
7(B)(2) was "unconstitutionally overbroad because it has the plain effect
of chilling legitimate First Amendment rights, 66 and that Canon 2(A)
was simply inapplicable to the charge because
a candidate's conduct with reference to speech by the candidate or the
unrepudiated statement of an aide[FN6] is essentially the candidate's
speech and is, therefore, not chargeable under Canon 2A. Hence,
Canon 2A. 7does not apply to any of the matters made the basis of this
complaint.

FN6. Canon 7B.(3) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics makes a
candidate accountable for the content of any statement by his campaign.' s
Ironically, in justifying its decision, the court in Butler misrepresented
certain facts. 69 The court declared: "In addition to Alabama, only three
other states-Michigan, Georgia, and Ohio-have enacted broad
restrictions on the kind of statements a judicial candidate may make
during an election campaign." 7' This statement was so utterly and
demonstrably wrong that it is difficult to regard it as merely a misstatement. By the time the Alabama Supreme Court issued its decision,
Minnesota's White case was already in the pipeline, and White's very
existence was proof that the court's list of three states was incomplete:
The canons under attack included the "announce clause," which rendered
Minnesota's among the broadest of such "broad restrictions." Indeed, at
the time White was decided, the canons of eleven states retained some
version of the "announce clause," although in all instances, it was
construed as a "pledges or promises clause" or a "commit clause." The
canons in forty-one states at that time also included both a separate
"pledges or promises clause" and a "misrepresent clause."
III. PART II: RUPTURE
By the time White was decided, most states had altered their canons
ofjudiecial conduct to reflect the ABA Model Code's new "commit clause"

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

218.
219.
219 n.6.
216.
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language. However, nine states still retained the "announce clause":
Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Mexico, and Pennsylvania. And despite the presence of the old
language, each of these nine states construed it as though it were a
"commit clause."
As a practical matter, White's holding is very simple-a mere twentyseven words: "The Minnesota Supreme Court's canon ofjudicial conduct
prohibiting candidates for judicial election from announcing their views
on disputed legal and political issues violates the First Amendment."7 1
That is the sum total of the precedent set by White. Indeed, the Court
explicitly declined to address the "pledges or promises clause" (or
"commit clause"), noting that that question was not before it. 72
White's dicta, however, are something else entirely. The decision was
authored by Justice Antonin Scalia,73 and is unusual in its reach
beyond the facts on the record and the applicable law. Indeed, Justice
Scalia analyzed both facts and law in terms of his personal opinions:
both as to the possible definitions of legal terms of art and as to his
personal evaluation of the credibility of one of the parties-something
that, theoretically, is traditionally beyond the scope of appellate review.
Justice Scalia's approach in effect thus turned the decision in White into
an announcement, albeit from the bench, of his own personal opinions
on what was, in that particular moment, the most hotly disputed legal
and political issue in the country. Any analysis of White should thus
include a degree of skepticism and a thorough subtextual search.
Justice Scalia effectively asserted that the entire case turned on his
own personal definitions of the word "impartiality."74 He then declared
that, for purposes of White, there are exactly three possible definitions
75
of the term "impartiality."
The first definition, "lack of bias for or
against either party to the proceeding,"7 6 seems fairly straightforward,
although reasonable people may disagree as to whether this is the most
obvious definition of impartiality. Justice Scalia rejected out of hand the
applicability of this definition to White.77 He next conceded that it was
"perhaps possible" to define "impartiality" as a "lack of preconception in
favor of or against a particular legal view. " " However, arguingthat

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2001).
Id. at 770.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 775, 777-78.
Id. at 775-76.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 776-77.
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"this is certainly not a common usage," he rejected this definition as
well. 9 And again, reasonable people certainly may disagree as to
whether such a definition is more than "perhaps possible" or "not a
common usage."" ° Justice Scalia finally settled upon his third definition of impartiality, "openmindedness," as the one at issue in White,"1
although he described it as "again not a common" usage.8 2 He further
defined this form of impartiality as a judge's "willing[ness] to consider
views that oppose his preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion,
when the issues arise in a pending case. 8 3
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concurrence in White has been widely
pilloried in the states as condescending to elected state judges-as a "you
made your bed; now lie in it" approach from a federal judge appointed
for life who faces none of the pressures of election. 4 Such criticisms
are accurate but misplaced: The offender here is not Justice O'Connor,
whose matter-of-fact analysis nonetheless reflects her experience in
running for elected office, including state judicial office. The real
offender on this count is Justce Scalia, who has never run for any
elective office, and whose entire experience as a judge has been at the
federal level, with appointments for life tenure with good behavior. His
opinion in White is rife with the influences of his experience--or lack
thereof.
The state had argued that judges who take public positions on issues
during their campaigns will subsequently feel compelled to rule in
accordance with those positions, a conclusion endorsed by the dissent.85
Justice Scalia described this argument as "implausible," because
"statements in election campaigns are such an infinitesimal portion of
the public commitments to legal positions that judges (or judges-to-be)
undertake." 6 Further, he described campaign promises themselves as
an "irrelevance," and "the least binding form of human commitment"-indeed, something that neither candidate nor voter would
take seriously. This, he argued, meant that judicial candidates would
feel far less pressure to keep campaign promises than to comply with
other statements they had made either before declaring or after

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

777-78.
777.
778.

792 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
816 (Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
779-80.
780.

984

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

election."' Moreover, he contended that the most likely source of
"popular disfavor" would be an unpopular ruling from the bench, not a
failure to keep a campaign promise.8 9
Such an analysis is, to put it charitably, ironic: Justice Scalia himself
had joined an earlier opinion written by Justice O'Connor that noted:
"Most voters never observe state judges in action, nor read judicial
opinions."9 Survey data supports Justice O'Connor's assertion, repeatedly showing that the average citizen is unlikely to be familiar with any
judicial decisions,9 1 making campaign statements the only "public
commitments to legal positions" that he or she is likely to encounter.
Moreover, judges at all levels of the federal and state judiciary are
regularly attacked by other public officials, interest groups, and the
media for allegedly contradicting their own former campaign statements
or opinions-a practice regularly criticized by Justice Scalia's colleagues.92
Justice Scalia's analysis of the Minnesota canon's treatment of
incumbent judges and non-judge challengers is also questionable. Using
the issue of same-sex marriage as a vehicle for the analysis, he alleged
that the canons would have barred a judicial candidate from speaking
publicly about his93 opinion on the issue. 94 According to Justice
Scalia, "He may say the very same thing.., up until the very day before
he declares himself a candidate, and may say it repeatedly (until
litigation is pending) after he is elected."95 This misstates the application of Minnesota's canon. While a citizen who was not yet a judge could
indeed take a position on the legitimacy of same-sex marriage prior to
declaring himself a judicial candidate, the canons were likely to permit

88. Id.
89. Id. at 780-81.
90. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Financing Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and
Challenge, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 849, 855 (2001).
92. See generally, e.g., Honorable Stephen Breyer, Panel Discussion, Judicial
Independence: The Role of Politics and the Rule of Law (Oct. 32, 2004), 71 STANFORD
LAWYER 15 (Winter 2005) (edited transcript). An edited transcript and video of the panel
is available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/events/recordings.html; Frontline: Justicefor
Sale (WGBM Educational Foundation television broadcast, Nov. 23, 1999). A transcript
of this episode is available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/justice/etc!
script.html.
93. While this Article attempts to use gender-neutral language to the extent possible,
Justice Scalia habitually uses the male pronoun to represent any hypothetical or unnamed
person, whether male or female. Because quotes from his opinion include the generic "he,"
I have likewise referred to this hypothetical judicial candidate as male.
94. White, 536 U.S. at 779-80.
95. Id.
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him to "say it repeatedly ... after he is elected" in only one very limited
circumstance: in a ruling from the bench in a case involving the
legitimacy of same-sex marriage.96
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, was Justice Scalia's assertion, in
effect, that Minnesota was not telling the truth when it defined its
compelling state interest in preserving the "announce clause" as
impartiality, and his substitution of his own judgment as to what that
purpose actually was.97 Indeed, he did not even bother to refer to that
interest as "impartiality," which is the term the state used. Rather, he
declared, "the purpose behind the announce clause is not openmindedness in the judiciary, but the undermining of judicial elections.""
At the time White was decided, both sides claimed victory: the
plaintiffs, on grounds that the Court overturned the hated "announce
clause"; the state, on grounds that the Court declined to extend its ruling
beyond a clause whose literal construction the state itself had already
abandoned. And since for years no state had construed the "announce
clause" as anything broader than a "commit clause," the decision's only
real practical effect was to enshrine what was already being done in the
states with the sanctity of Supreme Court precedent. On another level,
however, the official overturning of the "announce clause" also demolished a psychological barrier: Both judicial candidates and interest
groups were now emboldened to push at the barriers of a new array of
targets, including prohibitions on false and misleading statements and
pledges, promises, or commitments. That push came virtually immediately.

IV. PART III: AFTERSHOCKS
A.

Weaver v. Bonner

Seeking the Georgia Supreme Court seat of incumbent Leah Sears,
challenger George Weaver, in Weaver v. Bonner,9" attacked her record
by using false and misleading statements, 100 in contravention of the
Georgia Canons of Judicial Conduct. 1 ' He also engaged in other
activities expressly barred by the Canons, including personally soliciting
endorsements. His campaign literature included a brochure attacking
Sears for particular decisions, with the statements ripped so thoroughly

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 778.
Id. at 782.
309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1316.
GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004).
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out of context that some were effectively the direct opposite of Sears's
actual meaning. 10 2 Among the statements in Weaver's brochure were
the following:
""She would require the State to license same-sex marriages ......
" "She has referred to traditional moral standards as 'pathetic and
disgraceful."'
10 3
* "Justice Sears has called the electric chair 'silly.",

In a column adjacent to the last sentence, the words "THE DEATH
PENALTY' appeared in capital letters. °4
The brochure's content sparked a complaint to the Georgia Judicial
Qualifications Commission ("JQC"), and Weaver submitted the literature
to the JQC's Special Committee for review. Finding that the brochure
violated Georgia Canon 7(B)(1)(d)'s prohibition on false or misleading
statements, the Special Committee issued a confidential cease-and-desist
order requiring Weaver to halt distribution of the misleading materials.
If Weaver complied, the order would not be made public. 05 Weaver
then "altered" his campaign materials to read:
- "She has stated that 'it is not yet a perfect world' because 'lesbian
and gay couples in America cannot legally marry."'
* "When the Supreme Court upheld a traditional moral standard,
she said the result was 'pathetic and disgraceful."'
the death penalty but has called
- "Justice Sears says she0 supports
6

the electric chair 'silly.""1

This "altered" version, however, still represented a gross distortion of
Sears's actual statements. At the same time, Weaver's campaign
launched a television commercial that included the following:
- Narrator's voice-over: "What does Justice Sears stand for?
Same-sex marriage." This statement was accompanied by the words
"Same Sex Marriage."
* Narrator's voice-over: "She's questioned the constitutionality of
laws prohibiting sex with children under fourteen." This statement

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1316.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1316-17.
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was accompanied by the words "Questioned Laws Protecting Our
Children."
* Narrator's voice-over: "And she called the electric chair silly."
This statement
was accompanied by the words "Called Electric
10 7
Chair Silly."
After the commercial ran, three separate complaints were lodged with
After reviewing Weaver's current
the JQC's Special Committee.
campaign materials, including the television advertisement and the
revised brochure, the Special Committee concluded that both constituted
violations of the earlier cease-and-desist order."' 8 Because under the
terms of the cease-and-desist order, only compliance would ensure that
the charges remained confidential, the Special Committee issued a public
statement declaring that Weaver had "intentionally and blatantly"
violated the order and had conducted an "unethical, unfair, false and
intentionally deceptive" campaign. 0 9 The public statement came six
days before the election, which Weaver ultimately lost. Meanwhile, the
Special Committee forwarded its findings to the Georgia Bar's grievance
committee for possible disciplinary action. 10
Despite Weaver's contention that the JQC's cease-and-desist order and
its public criticism of him cost him the election, he had already begun
fighting the JQC's orders even before Election Day. Indeed, he filed suit
in federal district court the day after the Special Committee issued its
public statement, arguing that the JQC's actions, including both the
cease-and-desist order and its subsequent public criticism, violated his
First Amendment rights, and demanding a panoply of other remedies,
including a court-ordered special election pitting him against Sears,
apparently on the theory that, but for the JQC's interference, he would
have won.'
The district court's decision tracked that in Butler, holding that Canon
7(B)(1)(d)112 was "facially unconstitutional" on overbreadth grounds,
chilling "core political speech."1 3 Because the court found Canon
7(B)(2)114 and Rule 27115 constitutional, and denied his request for

107. Id. at 1317.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The court flatly denied Weaver's request for this form of extraordinary relief.
Id. at 1318.
112. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(1)(d) (2004).
113. Weaver, 309 F. 3d at 1318.
114. GA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B)(2) (2004).
115. RULES OF THE JUDICIAL QUALIFICATIONS COMM'N Rule 27 (2004).
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a special election, Weaver appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit. 116
The Eleventh Circuit overturned the district court's ruling with regard
to Canon 7(B)(2) and Rule 27.17 It held that, under the First Amendment, the state could not bar judicial candidates from soliciting
endorsements and contributions"8. personally or from making statements that were false and/or misleading. 19 The court held the ceaseand-desist order was an unconstitutional prior restraint:
[T]o be narrowly tailored, restrictions on candidate speech during
political campaigns must be limited to false statements that are made
with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard as to whether the
statement is false-i.e., an actual malice standard. Restrictions on
negligently made false statements are not narrowly tailored120under this
standard and consequently violate the First Amendment.
It also promulgated its "breathing space" argument:
For fear of violating these broad prohibitions, candidates will too often
remain silent even when they have a good faith belief that what they
would otherwise say is truthful. This dramatic chilling effect cannot
be justified by Georgia's interest in maintaining judicial impartiality
and electoral integrity. Negligent misstatements must be protected in
order to give protected speech the "breathing space" it requires. The
ability of an opposing candidate to correct negligent misstatements
with more speech more than offsets the danger of a misinformed
that might result from tolerating negligent misstateelectorate
121
ments.
Not content with expanding the rights of officers of the court to make
false statements, the court adopted the "actual malice" standard by way
of an especially shocking assertion: "We agree that the distinction
between judicial elections and other types of elections has been greatly
exaggerated, and we do not believe that the distinction, if there truly is
one, justifies greater restrictions on speech during judicial campaigns
than during other types of campaigns." 22
Even Justice Scalia, writing in White, acknowledged that judicial
elections were indeed different from other types of elections.123 The

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1318.
Id. at 1322-23.
Id. at 1322.
Id. at 1319.
Id. at 1319-20.
Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 783 (2002).
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infirmity in White was the announce clause's failure to meet strict
scrutiny. However, the Eleventh Circuit's assertion that what it clearly
believes is at most a slight distinction does not "justifly] greater
restrictions on speech during judicial campaigns," if widely accepted,
bodes ill for the "pledges or promises" and "commit" clauses." 4
Spargo v.New York State Commission on JudicialConduct
In Spargo v. New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct,125 the
New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct ("Commission")
instituted proceedings against Supreme Court Justice Thomas Spargo,
charging him with five violations of the Rules Governing Judicial
Conduct, 126 all stemming from his election campaign. While Commission proceedings were pending, Spargo filed suit in federal district court,
alleging that the proceedings themselves, and the rules1 27 under which
they were brought, were unconstitutional. The challenged rules included
both "baseline" rules governing the dignity and integrity of the judiciary
and rules containing specific restrictions on speech and political activity.
Since the Commission had not yet ruled in the case, much less had
Spargo appealed any adverse decision to the court of appeals, the
B.

124. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1321.
125. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y.)
[hereinafter Spargo 11, vacated, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Spargo III.
126. The five charges against Spargo were as follows: (1) While a candidate for Town
Justice, he gave coupons for free doughnuts, free coffee, and $5 worth of free gasoline to
potential voters, and bought cider and doughnuts, a round of drinks, and pizza for potential
voters, including government employees; (2) after taking office, he did not disclose to the
defense in criminal cases that the District Attorney-elect's campaign, which he had
represented, still owed him $10,000; (3) while holding judicial office, he participated in the
Republican Party's demonstration at the Florida Board of Elections offices to disrupt the
recount of votes in the 2000 presidential election; (4) also while holding judicial office, he
delivered the keynote speech at a fundraiser for the county Conservative Party; and (5) a
"Supplemental Charge" alleged that he had paid political party consultants for services
that were supposedly performed on a volunteer basis (i.e., as quid pro quo for the parties'
endorsements and support). See id. at 80.
127. Rule 100.1 of New York's Rules Governing Judicial Conduct instructs judges to
uphold the "integrity and independence" of the judiciary. N.Y. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Rule 100.1 (2003). Rule 100.2(A) provides that judges shall avoid "impropriety
and appearance of impropriety," and shall promote public confidence in the "integrity and
impartiality" of the judiciary. N.Y. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rule 100.2(A)
(2003). Rule 100.5(A)(1)(c-g) and Rule 100.5(A)(4)(a) bar judges from engaging in
"inappropriate political activity" and require them to uphold the "dignity appropriate to
judicial office," respectively. N.Y. RULES GOVERNING JUDICIAL CONDUCT Rules 100.5(A)(1)(c-g), 100.5(A)(4)(a) (2003).
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Commission argued that Spargo had failed to exhaust his state
2
remedies, and the district court was thus required to abstain. "
Judge David Hurd not only declined to abstain in the case, but issued
an opinion notable for its activism. Rather than confining himself to the
allegations in Spargo's complaint, or adhering to the jurisprudential
tradition of resolving cases and controversies on the narrowest applicable
grounds, he ruled, in effect, that Spargo could receive justice in no forum
but Judge Hurd's own.' 29 It was irrelevant that the Commission had
not yet had a chance to rule on the charges, Judge Hurd declared; even
if the Commission dismissed all charges, Spargo still would not have
obtained justice because his "constitutional challenge would go unheard.""' ° Judge Hurd contended that it was not clear that the
Commission had the power to resolve constitutional challenges, and that
However,
any review by the court of appeals was only discretionary.'
provides
which
rule,
of
the
the
language
this conclusion contradicts both
32
that
proof
and
appeals,'
such
that the Court of Appeals "shall review"
evidenced
as
as
mandatory,
appeals
such
the Court of Appeals regarded
by the fact that, in what was then the Commission's twenty-seven-year
existence, the court had reviewed every single appeal of a Commission
ruling as of right.
Judge Hurd's decision was disturbing in other respects. He accused
the state of lying in referring in its brief to New York's "longstanding
tradition" of using codes of judicial conduct, declaring that the state had
133
This
done so only since 1972, when the Commission was founded.
was inaccurate, to put it charitably; as the state's brief made abundantly
clear, New York State had utilized codes of judicial conduct in various
forms to govern judicial behavior since the early part of the 20th
century.13 1 In addition, Judge Hurd gave neither the state nor the
Commission the opportunity to address any of the alleged constitutional
infirmities: Rather than issue a temporary restraining order, he issued
an unprecedented permanent injunction overturning Rules 100(5)(A)(1)(c)-(g) and 100(5)(A)(4)(a), on grounds that they did not meet strict
135
as well as Rules
scrutiny and thus constituted a prior restraint,
136
for vagueness.
void
were
they
100.1 and 100.2(A), on grounds that

Spargo I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 82.
129. Id. at 85.
128.
130.
131.

Id. at 83.
Id.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

N.Y. JUD. LAw 44 § (9) (McKinney 2004).
Spargo I, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 76.
See Defendants' Memorandum at 20, Spargo 1 (2002).
See Spargo 1, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 92.
Id. at 91.
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The state immediately sought-and obtained-leave to appeal to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Those proceedings are discussed below
at Section E. Meanwhile, the court of appeals took notice of Judge
Hurd's decision and began taking affirmative steps to correct it, using
the vehicle of two appeals of Commission determinations already on that
court's docket.
C. In re Raab
In re Raab137 concerned four charges levied against Nassau County
District Court Judge Ira Raab, three involving various forms of political
activity and one involving alleged misconduct on the bench. '
In addressing the first three charges, the court of appeals distinguished Raab from White on grounds that the political activity involved
was conduct, rather than speech. 139 Nonetheless, the court assumed
a strict scrutiny test purposes of a White analysis, simultaneously
making it clear that it did not concede that strict scrutiny was the
court concluded that the rules in
requisite standard of review.The140
question were sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the first prong of
the test.14 1 With regard to the second prong of the test, whether the
rules served a compelling state interest, the court likewise showed no
hesitation: It defined the state interest at issue as the need to comply
with the Constitution's Due Process Clause"-specifically, in this
instance, to ensure a litigant's right to a "fair and impartial magistrate,"
14 3
which required a forum that would give effect to such a right.

137. 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003).
138. The four charges were as follows: First, that he had paid $10,000 to the Nassau
County Democratic Party operation as "his share" of the party machine's overall campaign
expenses; second, that, while a sitting judge, he had worked a phone bank on behalf of a
legislative candidate running on the ticket of the Working Families Party, allegedly to
build goodwill so that he could obtain an endorsement from the party for his own judicial
candidacy in a future election; third, that, also while a sitting judge, he took part in a
Working Families Party meeting for the purpose of screening local judicial candidates (his
role in the screening process included asking those candidates whether they would be
willing to publicize any endorsement they received from the Working Families Party); and
fourth, that he had issued a temporary restraining order on an ex parte basis, and that
after the order was overturned on appeal, he told the attorney who filed the appeal "that
he would be on the bench another 11 years, that he had a 'long memory' and would
remember the law firm's actions and that it was a 'good thing' the firm did not practice
matrimonial law." See id. at 1288-89.
139. Id. at 1290.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1292.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1290-91.
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Under this analysis, it was thus no great leap for the court to conclude
that the Due Process Clause required the state to "create such a forum
and prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption, including
political bias or favoritism:""
Not only must the State respect the First Amendment rights ofjudicial
candidates and voters but also it must simultaneously ensure that the
judicial system is fair and impartial for all litigants, free of the taint
of political bias or corruption, or even the appearance of such bias or
corruption. In our view, the rules at issue, when viewed in their
totality, are narrowly drawn to achieve these goals. 4'
D.

In re Watson

The court of appeals decided another judicial conduct case, In re
Watson,"' at the same time. All five charges against Watson stemmed
directly from his campaign, during which he made questionable public
statements in a variety of contexts. 4 ' Seeking endorsements and
votes, Watson had written a letter to local law-enforcement officers,
asking them to "put a real prosecutor on the bench." 48 He also sent
letters to the editor of the local newspaper, which included inflammatory
and misleading statements149 regarding allegedly skyrocketing local
crime. He also blamed his opponents in the race for this supposed
increase in criminal activity: "[Mly opponents have been in office
together for the last several years. Arrests have skyrocketed in Lockport

144. Id. at 1291.
145. Id. at 1292. The court also determined that, under the New York Rules Governing
Judicial Conduct, political activity on behalf of one's own campaign, within certain
restraints, is permissible. However, political activity on behalf of others is not permissible.
Id.
146. 794 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2003).
147. The charges were as follows: (1) failure to maintain high standards of conduct;
(2) failure to promote confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; (3)
failure to maintain the dignity of the office and to act in a manner that was consistent with
the judiciary's integrity and independence; (4) committing or appearing to commit to
particular actions (pledges or promises); and (5) knowingly making false statements or
misrepresentations about himself or his opponent. See id. at 2-3.
148. Id. at 2. One of the statements in question read: "We are in desperate need of
a Judge who will work with the police, not against them. We need a judge who will assist
our law enforcement officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning up our city
streets." Id.
149. Id. at 2-3. The letters included the statement that "Lockport is attracting
criminals from Rochester, Niagara Falls and Buffalo to come into our city to peddle their
drugs and commit their crimes." Arguing that, as a prosecutor, he had "sent a message
that this type of conduct will not be tolerated in Niagara County," he urged local voters to
elect him "so that the City of Lockport can begin to send this same message." Id.
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recently, even though crime is down countywide, statewide and
nationally."'5 ° These themes became a common thread in Watson's
campaign advertising,' which likewise ran in the local newspaper.
Watson was also interviewed by the newspaper, and was quoted in a
similar vein: He alleged that the Lockport City Court's caseload was
high because "criminals from surrounding communities are flocking into
Lockport. Once we gain a reputation for being tough, you'd be surprised
how many will go elsewhere, making the caseload much more manageable."'52 In another quote, he argued, "We need a city court judge who
will work together with our local police department to help return
Lockport to the city it once was." 5 ' In still another quote, Watson
declared that judges should use bail and sentencing to "make it very
unattractive for a person to be committing a crime in the City of
Lockport." 1" 4
The court of appeals used the same analysis in Watson that it used in
Raab-i.e., strict scrutiny, but again, for the sake of argument; it seems
clear in both cases that the judges did not believe that the Rules were
subject to strict scrutiny. 5 From there, the court's analysis tracked
that in Raab almost exactly: The "pledges or promises clause" at issue
was narrowly tailored to serve the state's compelling interest in
satisfying its obligation under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution to ensure a litigant's right to a fair and impartial magistrate and a
forum that would ensure such a magistrate.'5 6 Because the court
determined, first, that the "pledges or promises clause" was constitutional, and second, that Watson had committed a violation sufficient to
uphold the Commission's decision, the court limited its ruling to that

150. Id. at 3.
151. Id. According to Watson's ads, "arrests tell the story," and he touted his "proven
experience in the war against crime." The court of appeals determined that Watson
actually "correlated the increase in arrests with the time period the incumbents were in
office, indicating that if elected he would take action they had failed to take to deter crime.
These statements echoed sentiments he expressed in the correspondence published in the
local newspaper." Id.
152. Id. Among Watson's statements in the interviews: "[TIhe court must remain
impartial and evenhanded, but the city must establish a reputation for zero tolerance," and
voters "must no longer put up with drug dealers and other violent criminals from
Rochester, Buffalo and Niagara Falls, who feel that it is acceptable for them to come into
the City of Lockport and commit crimes." He also asserted that it was the court's job to
"deter criminals before they come into the city." Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 6.
156. Id. at 7.
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section157 of the rules, declining to address the other challenged sections.
E.

Spargo in the Second Circuit

Perhaps more significant than the court of appeals holding on the
merits of Raab and Watson was its tactical approach. The court clearly
treated Raab and Watson as an opportunity for a preemptive strike in
the battle over Spargo,"8 via which it could put on the record its
opinion that the federal district court erred in even taking the case.
Although abstention was not at issue in either Raab or Watson, the court
of appeals included language in each decision making clear its opinion
that the district court should have abstained until Spargo had exhausted
all state remedies:' 59 It refuted Spargo's argument (not raised in Raab
or Watson) that neither the Commission on Judicial Conduct nor the
court of appeals could guarantee
adequate remedies where constitutional
160
issues were at stake.
The court of appeals approach was a smashing success. The Second
Circuit held:
[T]here is no reason for this Court to ignore the New York Court of
Appeals' subsequent decisions in [Raab and Watson], both of which
unambiguously affirm that the Commission will consider First Amendment arguments and, further, establish that sanctioned judges may
seek mandatory review of the Commission's decision before the Court
of Appeals.' 6
Spargo's case was thus remanded back to the Commission on Judicial
Conduct to undergo proceedings as prescribed under state law.'62 If,
as is widely anticipated, he disagrees with the Commission's ruling, he
will then be entitled to take his case to the court of appeals as of right.
And if, as is equally widely anticipated, Spargo dislikes the court of
appeals ruling, he can then return to federal court to contest the merits.
This time, Spargo's challenges to the "baseline" Rules, in addition to the
speech restrictions, are expected to become a major issue.
Three major factors are now combining to push the "commit clause" to
the Supreme Court. First, application of the "commit clause" and

157. Id. at 8.
158. Spargo H, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003).
159. In re Raab, 783 N.E.2d 1287, 1289 (N.Y. 2003); In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y.
2003).
160. Spargo 11, 351 F.3d at 68.
161. Id. at 78-79.
162. See id. at 85-86. As this Article goes to press, the Commission has not rendered
a decision.
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interpretations of what White requires vary widely between jurisdictions,
and a significant split in the circuits is generally expected. Second,
finality in two of the major existing cases-one of them White itself-is
still outstanding on three major groups of issues: the "commit clause,"
restrictions on solicitation and related political activity, and the baseline
canons. Third, the plaintiffs in both White and Spargo have shown a
predisposition to challenge adverse decisions early and often, and are
both expected to take future appeals all the way to the Supreme Court.

V. PART IV: TRIPPING THE RIFT
As a practical matter, then, how should judicial candidates learn to
speak publicly? It is clear that some judicial candidates, particularly
incumbents, believe that because White did not address the "commit
clause," their obligations with regard to public statements have not
changed at all: Such candidates continue to limit their public statements to such basics as professional qualifications. It is equally clear
that other judicial candidates, particularly challengers, regard White as
a license to make virtually any public statement about any topic,
regardless of whether they are likely to be faced with such cases or
controversies on the bench, or whether such a statement amounts to a
commitment to reach particular decisional outcomes.
However, the greatest pressure on judicial candidates with regard to
public statements is still likely to come from external sources-i.e.,
independent interest groups with definite legal and public policy
agendas. A favorite tactic of such groups (and, indeed, one that has long
been used in legislative- and executive-branch races) is the candidate
Indeed, how to handle candidate questionnaires is
questionnaire.
currently perhaps the single most common question posed-by candidates, by campaign conduct committees, by disciplinary and other
bodies-to the members of the National Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on
This section analyzes candidate
Judicial Campaign Conduct.'63
candidates to straddle the White
judicial
for
a
vehicle
as
questionnaires
fault line successfully.
This Article thus uses the judicial candidate questionnaire as a vehicle
for turning tradition on its head: converting opportunities to undergo
the judicial disciplinary process into opportunities for essential public
education; converting opportunities to undermine judicial independence
into support for a robustly independent yet accountable third branch.

163. See generally National Center for State Courts' National Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee on Judicial Campaign Conduct, at http://www.judicialcampaignconduct.org.
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Whither Answers?
Even in today's post-White environment, judicial ethics bodies often
resort to the traditional "do not answer" approach as a default response.
But today's judicial elections, running into millions of dollars in
campaign spending and accompanied by the sort of vitriolic third-party
advertising that has generally been the province of Congressional and
presidential contests, have made such an approach not merely impractical but untenable. The canons of judicial conduct no longer serve their
former prophylactic function: The public neither knows nor cares about
distinctions between legitimate and inappropriate questions and
responses, and agenda-driven interest groups are only too eager to
exploit that fact. As a practical matter, judicial candidates must be
prepared to deal with these circumstances as they are. Moreover, while
there are compelling interests in barring judicial candidates from
making pledges, promises, or commitments to particular decisional
outcomes, judicial candidates (and sitting judges) also have an affirmative duty to speak on the record about certain types of issues, and to
help educate the public about the role and function of the judiciary and
the courts. Recognizing this combination of circumstance and duty, it
becomes clear that common default approaches are now unworkable:
Judicial candidates no longer have the luxury of either categorical
refusals or full substantive responses.
Judicial candidates must also remember that, while White and its
progeny may allow greater latitude in public comments, aspirational
considerations carry great weight: It is not only appropriate but an
obligation of the judicial office for judicial candidates to hold themselves
to higher standards of conduct than what is expected of other citizens-including candidates for other types of offices. The public likewise
has a right not only to expect but to demand that those who would serve
as their judges do so. This analysis should thus be regarded as only a
baseline for judicial candidates: The role and function of the judicial
office, and the integrity and impartiality necessary to that function,
demand that judicial candidates adhere to standards that exceed those
required by law.
This section makes the case for a new, two-pronged approach: (1) to
give the public as much information as possible within ethical guidelines, and (2) without making or appearing to make a pledge, promise,
or commitment to particular decisional outcomes or otherwise call into
question the candidate's impartiality in future cases. Discussed below,
within the context of questionnaires, are three major categories of public
commentary by judicial candidates: (1) what they should not answer, to
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inform how they determine, (2) what they may answer, and which
combined indicate (3) what they should answer.
1.

What Judicial CandidatesShould Not Answer

Under the current jurisprudential framework, there are three primary
categories of answers that judicial candidates should not give: (1) those
that signal, either directly or covertly, or amount to a pledge, promise,
or commitment to, specific case outcomes; (2) those that constitute false
attacks on one's opponent; and (3) those that falsely characterize one's
own record. The problems of signaling and pledges, promises, or
commitments are discussed at length below in Subsection 2. The latter
two categories are matters of ethics and judicial integrity, and notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit's decisions in Butler and Weaver, it is
appropriate to expect those individuals who aspire to interpret, apply,
and uphold the nation's laws to hold themselves to higher standards of
conduct than what may be minimally required.
2.

What Judicial CandidatesMay Answer

Judicial
The approach recommended here is counterintuitive:
to
questionnaires.
be
to
respond
should
approach
default
candidates'
However, (properly) responding is not synonymous with providing a
substantive answer to the merits of any particular question as it is
presented. Rather, judicial candidates should follow a few common-sense
steps, each of which is discussed in turn below. The following discussion
highlights pitfalls that candidates must keep firmly in mind at every
step of the process, with examples drawn from actual judicial candidate
questionnaires.
a. Step One: Analyze the Question Closely
No question or answer, however innocuous, cannot be used inappropriately in the service of an interest group's agenda. However, judicial
candidates can no longer rationalize a refusal to respond on this basis,
since such a refusal will itself be used to further the same agenda, and
likely to worse effect. In deciding whether and how to respond, judicial
candidates must analyze two basic components of any question: (1)
source; and (2) structure, which includes types of questions and what
may be termed "response capacity."
(1) Sources
Judicial candidate questionnaires derive from a dizzying array of
sources, each with its own viewpoint(s) and agenda(s). Common sources
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generally fall into three major categories: (1) screening entities,
including official screening bodies used to aid in interim appointments
and bar association screening committees that serve a voter education
function; (2) the media, including editorial board queries; and (3) interest
groups, including (but not limited to) political parties, advocacy
organizations, corporations and other business entities, and "good
government" groups. Interest group motivations run the gamut, as do
the effects their questionnaires produce.
Whether to answer questionnaires in the first category may not be a
discretionary decision. Official screening bodies" that aid the executive branch in making interim appointments to the bench may have
constitutional or statutory authority; responding in full to their queries
is likely to be a prerequisite for consideration. Similarly, responding to
questionnaires from bar association screening committees may be
discretionary more in theory than in fact: In many jurisdictions,
particularly at the local level, the work of such committees has become
so institutionalized as to make participation virtually mandatory. These
committees often report the results of their screening processes to the
media and voters, frequently accompanied by ratings such as "qualified,"
"well-qualified," or "not qualified"; refusal to participate in the screening
process often earns a candidate an automatic rating of "not qualified."
Since these committees comprise members of the bar, including retired
or former judges, a "not qualified" rating may carry enormous weight
with voters who have little other information upon which to make an
informed voting decision. Moreover, although such questionnaires are
generally narrowly drafted to address a candidate's qualifications,
experience, judicial temperament, and other issues related directly to
fitness for the bench, many of the questions and answers are subject to
interpretations and uses that can hinder judicial independence. An
example of such a bar screening committee questionnaire is one
disseminated by165 Seattle's King County Bar Association ("KCBA"),
discussed below.

The second category, the media, presents serious public relations
pitfalls. The media play essential roles within our governmental system,
including educating and informing the public, uncovering and deterring
inappropriate behavior by public officials, and what may loosely be

164. Despite the fact that such bodies generally deal only with judicial appointments,
in most states with judicial elections, judges initially reach the bench via interim appointment. Thus, answers given to such screening bodies have the potential to become issues
in future campaigns.
165. King County Bar Association, Sample Questions for Judicial Candidates, at
http://www.kcba.org/judicial-ratings/pdf/sample-questions-forcandidates.pdf.
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termed "truth-seeking" generally. While there is a good argument for
making certain types of questions off-limits with regard to judicial
candidates, the media's performance of these functions applies no less to
judges and judicial candidates than to officials of the other branches of
government. And the media are already predisposed to regard judges
and the courts as less than forthcoming: Perhaps the single most
common complaint of American journalists with regard to the judiciary
is their perception that judges "hide behind" the canons to avoid
answering legitimate questions on any topic whatsoever.
Moreover, judicial candidates need the press-and they need good
relationships with the press. Judicial candidates complain, equally
universally, that the voting public knows little and cares less about
either their candidacies or the role and function of the judicial branch.
Press coverage is often the only way to ensure that the public is made
aware of a judicial candidate's campaign, particularly for those
candidates unable to raise the kinds of funds that permit them to run
sophisticated television advertisements. Those judicial candidates who
decline to cultivate relationships with local press are less likely to
receive sympathetic coverage-and those who decline to respond to
media questionnaires risk media coverage that portrays them as not
merely unresponsive to the "needs of voters," but as unaccountable to the
public they serve.
However, the most prevalent source of judicial candidate questionnaires is the special interest group. Such groups represent myriad
perspectives and agendas, some relatively benign, others openly
threatening to judicial independence. A few groups, such as state and
local affiliates of the League of Women Voters, disseminate questionnaires that have been carefully drafted (and often vetted by local bar
associations or other experts) to serve a voter education function without
compromising judicial independence. However, most interest-group
questionnaires are designed explicitly for purposes that are antithetical
to judicial independence: as "stalking horses" for support of or opposition to particular judicial candidates; to put judicial candidates' opinions
on record with regard to issues likely to come before the courts; and to
attempt to force candidates to commit to particular decisional outcomes.
Moreover, such interest groups often work to evade campaign finance
and public disclosure laws, so that it becomes impossible for the average
voter to determine the agenda behind the questionnaire. While many
well-known groups, such as the Christian Coalition, Right to Life, and
Planned Parenthood of America distribute questionnaires under their
own names, it is increasingly common for individual groups or coalitions
of organizations to operate under the name of a "shell" group, frequently
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66
christened "Citizens for [insert benevolent-sounding purpose here]."
One example is the "First Judicial District Committee for Judicial
Transparency," which distributed a judicial candidate questionnaire in
This "Committee" comprised of two
Minnesota's 2002 elections.
Minnesota lawyers whose agenda included overturning the canons of
judicial conduct that were challenged in White, and who worked hand in
glove with White plaintiff Gregory Wersal, who designed and drafted the
"Committee's" questionnaire.6 7

(2) Structure
As noted above, issues of structure fall into two basic categories: (1)
question type; and (2) response capacity. Within each category, judicial
candidates must be aware of an array of subsidiary issues, discussed
below.
(a) Types of Questions
Question type is rarely, if ever, straightforward. Judicial candidates
should look for problems of phrasing; use of prophylactic language;
apparent and subtextual purposes; and the agenda served-which, even
if the question itself is identical, may differ substantially between
Such problems include "question-begging" and "loaded"
sources.
language; "separation of powers" infirmities; "direct signaling"; and
"covert signaling." Judicial candidates should look for and address each
of these issues on a question-by-question basis.
i) Loaded Language and "Begging the Question." Judicial
questionnaires frequently comprise questions that are logically unsound
in a variety of ways. Most often, they are written in a distinctly
subjective manner, using "loaded" language to cast the question in terms
of a particular perspective or to imply a "correct" answer. A common
version of this tendency involves what logicians call "begging the

166. One such example is "Citizens for a Strong Ohio" ("CSO"), which ran particularly
nasty and misleading attack ads in the 2000 Ohio Supreme Court race. CSO refused to
disclose its membership or funding under state disclosure laws, and remains embroiled in
litigation over that issue. However, CSO turned out to be a front group for the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform, a so-called "tort reform" advocacy
group, and the Ohio Chamber of Commerce. See, e.g., Ad Campaign Fines Put on Hold,
AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 20, 2004, at D5, available at http://www.ohio.com/mld/ohio/2004/
11/21/news/state/10231376.htm?lc.
167. Examples of problematic questions from this questionnaire are discussed
throughout the ensuing subsections.
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question": in legal parlance, bootstrapping the desired conclusions into
the question's premise(s) in order to obtain a "correct" answer.
Minnesota's First Judicial District Committee for Judicial Transparency
2002 questionnaire, 168 discussed above, provides clear examples of this
practice:
8. Rights of Business Owner. Do you agree with the Minnesota
Supreme Court decision Lewis v. Cooper (1986), which held that a
private business owner does not have a constitutional right to express
169
religious beliefs through non-coercive policies? Yes __ No
In this example, the very title begs the question: It assumes a
category of legal "rights" that may not actually exist, at least for
purposes of the question's true subject matter. Similarly, the phrase
"non-coercive policies" implies the conclusion that such a description is
accurate.17° In actuality, such cases generally uphold the rights of
employees to be free from religious pressures in the inherently coercive
"
' In this context, use of words and
environment of the workplace. 17
phrases such as "rights," "constitutional right," and "non-coercive" are
chosen specifically for their loaded effect: They are virtually guaranteed
to engender certain automatic responses, irrespective of the lack of
accuracy with which they are used. Answering "yes" to this question is
subject to interpretation as opposition to religious freedom; answering
"no" may be an incorrect statement of the candidate's beliefs, and implies
an incorrect statement of the law.
A similar example is found in a subsequent question:
10. Voluntary School Prayer. Do you agree with the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), which held a
prayer offered by a clergy [sic] at a high school graduation ceremony
was unconstitutional? Yes - No _
Again, the heading begs the question by bootstrapping the questioner's
conclusion into the premise: It assumes that the prayer described in the

168. See Minnesota Women Lawyers, Few Responded to Conservative Group's Judicial
Questionnaire. Only One 1st District Candidate Answered Controversial Questions on
It
"Judicial Philosophy," available at http://www.mwlawyers.org/new-page-19.htm.
appears that the "Committee" does not maintain a Web site. However, Minnesota Women
Lawyers covered the "Committee" and its questionnaire in the publication's September 16,
2002 edition; Minnesota Women Lawyers has helpfully archived the article on the
organization's Web site.
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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case was indeed "voluntary," when in actuality, the Court found that
such a prayer was precisely the opposite, since it was a formal part of
the ceremony in an inherently coercive environment. 173 Again, loaded
"voluntary,"
language is used to induce an instinctive response:
"prayer," "clergy." And again, answering "yes" is likely to be interpreted
as anti-religion, while answering "no" is unlikely to reflect either the law
or the candidate's beliefs accurately.
A third use of loaded language involves unverifiable blanket statements regarding what "the media" "reported," or requests that the
candidate indicate agreement or disagreement with opinions masquerading as statements of fact. The following are also taken from the First
Judicial District Committee's questionnaire:
12. Gun Control Attitudes.
D. Prior to passage of the federal 1994 "Assault Rifle" ban, the media
repeatedly reported how these weapons were the "preferred weapons
of gangs and drug dealers." Once the law took effect, the media
reported that still more had to be done because "assault rifles" are
rarely used in crime.
Do you believe the above statement is an accurate characterization
of media reporting on this topic? Yes __ No_
F. Would you agree with the following - That as a practical matter,
"gun control" laws (like waiting periods, background checks, gun bans,
ammunition bans, registration, licensing, etc.) are ineffectual in there
[sic] ostensible goal of reducing armed crime and accidental death?
174
Yes __ No
These statements, phrased as factual declarations, not only contain a
distinct point of view but imply a "correct" answer. Such questions, here
involving passage or defeat of gun-control legislation, are also the
province of the legislature, not the judiciary. Such questions also suffer
from another flaw, discussed below.
A final example, also from the First Judicial District Committee's
questionnaire, involves a particularly misleading use of language. First,
the question reproduced an excerpt from a newspaper article quoting a
legal scholar's comment on federalism, but omitted a portion of the
comment. Next, the question asked the judicial candidate to substitute
other words for the material portion of the quote. Finally, it asked the
candidate to express support for the new proposition, as phrased with
the "replacement" words:

173. Id,
174. Id.
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12. Gun Control Attitudes.
E. The Supreme Court struck down the "Gun-Free School Zones Act"
in the [sic] U.S. v. Lopez (1995). Harvard Law Professor Laurence
Tribe was quoted in a Washington Post service article to the AmericanStatesman saying, "This court takes structural limits more serious
than people had thought ... which liberals and pragmatists find
dismaying."
Do you believe Laurence Tribe's use of the words "structural limits"
could be replaced with the words "constitutional limits" without
changing the meaning of the quote? Yes

__

No

_'

Even leaving aside the lack of context presented by the segment of the
quote replaced by ellipses, this question is particularly flawed. First, the
question's putative topic is "gun control attitudes," although the cited
quote's point refers to the Commerce Clause and attendant federalism
issues. Second, both the original version and the "replacement" phrase
are abstract legal theories subject to varying interpretations. Finally,
the question's subtextual agenda is an attempt to establish the
candidate's so-called "judicial philosophy." In other words, it uses code
language to establish the respondent as either a "strict constructionist"
or a "judicial activist"-labels that are themselves code words that signal
how the candidate is likely to decide certain types of cases.
ii) "Separation of Powers" Infirmities. Another common fault
found in judicial candidate questionnaires may be termed the "separation of powers" problem. Generally, such questions seek to force the
candidate to take a position on a controversial issue that is not within
the purview of the courts, but rather, is the province of the legislative
and/or executive branches. The problem is two-fold: First, and perhaps
most obviously, a substantive answer will indicate a judicial candidate's
personal proclivities on what may be a highly inflammatory issue, such
as abortion or capital punishment, leading voters to believe that the
candidate's personal opinion will affect how she rules in particular types
of cases. Second, a substantive answer also erroneously implies (even if
inadvertently on the part of the candidate) that her election to the bench
will place her in a position to address the issue. And while it is true
that tangential issues may become subjects of future litigation that
might come before the court, this hardly saves the question: Instead, it
compounds the threat to judicial independence, first, by erroneously
implying that the judge will have the power to affect legislation directly,

175.

Id.
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and second, by appearing to commit her to particular decisional
outcomes on any attenuated issues that may be challenged in the courts.
In 2001, the Planned Parenthood of Western Pennsylvania Action
Fund ("PPWPAF") disseminated such a questionnaire. 76 In this
instance, the questionnaire was distributed to all candidates, regardless
of office. However, questions that are entirely appropriate for candidates
for legislative and executive offices are frequently problematic for
judicial candidates. The PPWPAF questionnaire was not tailored to
apply to the judicial function, nor were judicial candidates given any
"opt-out" mechanism or other form of disclaimer. A classic example is
the following question:
II. Safe, Legal Abortion
C. Medicaid Coverage for Abortion
The federal Medical Assistance program pays for health care for lowincome persons. This program covers abortion only for women whose
health or life is threatened by continuing their pregnancy or who are
pregnant as a result of rape or incest. Unintended pregnancy is very
common among women of all economic classes in the United States.
One half of all pregnancies are unintended and half of those end in
abortion. For a low-income woman, an unintended pregnancy can
prevent her from completing education or job training or from
obtaining employment, with the result she and her family remain in
poverty. As a result, several states provide Medical Assistance coverage
for abortions in order to guarantee that low-income women have the
right to choose. Still, it is conservatively estimated that 1 in 5 women
on Medicaid is forced to carry to term because she does not receive
assistance through her state and cannot afford to pay for an abortion
herself.
7. Do you support the restoration of medical assistance coverage of
abortion for low-income women?

__

Support

-

Oppose 77

This question asks whether the candidate supports or opposes
legislation requiring medical coverage for abortion services for lowincome patients. Whether a judicial candidate personally supports or
opposes such a law-which can be enacted only by the legislative and
executive branches-is irrelevant to her duties on the bench. A more
accurate predictor ofjudicial qualifications and temperament is whether,
despite the candidate's personal support for or opposition to such
legislation, she will uphold it-provided, of course, that it passes
constitutional muster and suffers from no internal legal conflicts.

176. See Planned Parenthood of Western Pennsylvania Action Fund ("PPWPAF"), 2001
CandidateQuestionnaire,availableat http://www.ppwp.org/ppwp/vote/Questionnaire.PDF.
177. Id.
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Many judicial candidates may fall prey to a false sense of security in
providing full and substantive responses to such questions, since,
regardless of their personal political opinions, such issues remain outside
the scope of their jurisdiction. Judicial candidates can-or should-be
able to interpret such questions and their answers in light of their
irrelevance to the judicial function. The public, however, cannot be
expected to make such distinctions, and interest groups will be only too
willing to exploit public failure to serve their own ends. As a practical
matter, providing substantive responses to such questions may foster the
perception that the candidate, if elected, (1) will play a role in ensuring
that the legislation in question is (or is not) enacted; (2) will lobby for (or
against) it; and/or (3) will adhere to her personal opinions, notwithstanding the law or the facts of the individual case, in upholding or overturning the legislation when it comes before her in a case or controversy.
iii) Direct "Signaling." The problem with judicial candidate
questionnaires is not that they are designed to disclose the candidate's
personal political views, but rather, that their subtextual purpose is to
force judicial candidates to issue decisions in the future that are
consistent with their campaign statements. The questionnaire thus
becomes a dual-purpose tool: as a means during the campaign to
achieve a sympathetic bench, and as a bludgeon to ensure future
decisional compliance. The PPWPAF questionnaire, discussed above,
and a 2004 primary questionnaire distributed by the Alabama-based
League of Christian Voters, 1 8 provide examples of attempts to secure
direct signals of future decisional outcomes.
The PPWPAF questionnaire also provides examples of contemporary
issues that are likely to come before the courts: 179
II. Safe, Legal Abortion
D. Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act, which was designed to restrict
and limit access to abortion, went into effect in March of 1994. In its
first year of implementation, women, hospitals, and reproductive health
care providers reported an increase in the number of adult and

178. See The 10 Questions the League of Christian Voters Plans to Ask Candidates,
Feb. 9, 2004, at B1, available at http://www.ledgerenquirer.com/mld/
ledgerenquirer/news/local/7909041.htm. Strangely enough, the LCV does not make its
questionnaire available on its Web site. However, The Associated Press reproduced the
questionnaire's ten questions; the Ledger-Enquirer of Columbus, Georgia picked up the
story, and has helpfully archived the article on its Web site.
179. For purposes of this analysis, the fact that PPWPAF authored this particular
question is irrelevant; its inverse could just as easily be (and frequently is) asked by antiabortion groups in the same manner.
LEDGER-ENQUIRER,
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teenaged women who left the state in order to choose abortion; an
increase in emergency room visits resulting from self-induced, illegal
and unsafe abortions; and an increase in the number of women unable
to exercise their right to choose at all. The Journal of the American
Medical Association of Mississippi's 24-hour delay law enacted in 1992
also noted these effects in a study.
Mandatory 24-Hour Delay and State-Mandated Lecture
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act requires a woman to receive a
state-mandated lecture and then delay her decision at least 24 hours
before having an abortion. There is no public health rationale for these
restrictions, which were designed solely to make abortion more difficult
to obtain. The mandatory 24-hour delay often causes a wait of up to
one week that can result in riskier procedures.
8. Do you oppose the restrictions that require a mandatory 24-hour
delay and a state-mandated lecture prior to having an abortion?
Yes __ Nol s0
This fact pattern is not only likely to come before the courts, but is likely
to comprise virtually identical issues of law. If a judicial candidate
responds fully and substantively to the question as presented-i.e., if she
limits her response to checking the blank next to the word "Yes" or the
word "No"-her impartiality in future cases involving these issues will
be doubted by one side or the other. The inevitable result will be
charges, on the one hand, of "judicial activism" and "legislating from the
bench," or on the other, that she has incorrectly reached for invalid
exceptions in order to avoid criticism that she is simply ruling in
accordance with her (publicly-declared) personal opinions. Indeed, such
a situation is so untenable to the interests ofjustice that she may simply
be forced to recuse herself entirely from all such cases, absurdly
nullifying any legal benefit PPWPAF presumably sought in the first
place by attempting to force public disclosure of her personal views.
The League of Christian Voters ("LCV") took an unusually unsubtle
approach in its offering on the abortion issue:
7. What actions have you personally taken on the issue of pro-life
[sic]?'8

In a state with a substantial population of religious conservatives,
abortion is highly controversial, to say the least. It is an issue that is
also likely to come before the courts with some regularity. But despite
its somewhat vague wording, this question is actually unusually blunt:
It seeks not only to ascertain whether a candidate's political views are

180.
181.

PPWPAF, supra note 176.
LEDGER-ENQUIRER, supra note 178.
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what the group terms "pro-life," but to put him on notice that he is
expected to take action publicly to support so-called "pro-life" laws and
activities. In this case, the demands extend beyond signaling an actual
commitment to taking action to ensure a "pro-life" society, which by
definition would require the candidate to oppose existing law and
precedent. It requires no small leap of logic for voters to assume that a
judicial candidate who answers this question as presented (and,
presumably, by including examples of what "actions" he has "personally
taken on the issue of pro-life") will not uphold Roe v. Wade' s ' and its
progeny. Likewise, a litigant whose case involves her right to an
abortion is unlikely to feel that she will receive anything approaching a
fair and impartial hearing from such a judge.
A similar problem arises in a subsequent question:
8. Do you believe marriage should be defined as a union between one
man and one woman? 8 3 Please discuss. Have you actually done
anything on this issue?1
Again, this question goes beyond a request for the candidate's personal
opinions, seeking examples of actions (or, more accurately, activism) that
presumably would demonstrate ideological purity. And again, this issue
is one that is likely to come before the courts, since the past two years
have seen numerous challenges to laws that prevent gay couples from
marrying and the passage of numerous public referenda in an attempt
to continue to prevent marriage between gay partners.
Other than these questions' efforts to ensure an activist bench, they
are not especially surprising. Certainly, their subject matter comprises
issues one would expect from a group that clearly identifies its agenda
as encompassing those topics. However, the LCV questionnaire also
includes questions that attempt to influence judicial candidates to defy
unpopular decisions openly:
of the Ten Command4. What actions did you take about the display
84
ments in the Alabama Judicial Building?
This question concerns an especially volatile issue in Alabama: former
Chief Justice Roy Moore's unilateral installation, without consulting his
colleagues and under cover of night, of a two-and-a-half-ton granite
monument representing the Decalogue. What is particularly shocking
about this question is that it seeks to force judicial candidates, in
answering it, to take two particularly troubling steps: (1) to express

182.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

183.

LEDGER-ENQUIRER, supra note 178.

184. Id.
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direct opposition to a duly-issued court order, as well as decades of
precedent; and (2) to take action that contravenes such an
constitutional
18
order. 5
Again, answering such questions as presented is likely to achieve two
results, neither of which enhances public confidence in the integrity of
the judiciary First, a judge who has provided such answers will find
that any decision involving related issues will be regarded by a
substantial segment of the population as suspect at best. Second (and,
one hopes, more likely) the judge will be forced to recuse himself from
any case involving such issues, voiding his election's effect on the
interest group's agenda and depriving an overworked court system of the
judge's services and expertise.
iv) "Covert" Signaling. Questions that seek to produce "covert"
signaling may present a greater problem than those with a more overt
approach, if only because such questions may appear, to judicial
candidates and voters alike, to be harmless. Frequent topics of such
questions are what appear to be merely administrative matters;
however, the language and phrasing used may be interpreted by
interested parties to constitute commitments to decisional outcomes.
Often, they employ "code words" that have a very specific substantive
meaning for members of the interest group distributing the questionnaire; these members may interpret the use of such code words as a
direct signal of intent to comply with or promote their interests. The
LCV's questionnaire again provides an example:
5. What actions did you take regarding the removal of Chief Justice
Roy Moore?'86
To a voter who has no particular interest in or opinion of the Decalogue
controversy, this question may appear to be simply a query regarding
the mechanics of judicial discipline. For members of the LCV, however,
who openly opposed Moore's removal and advocated keeping the
Decalogue in the courthouse rotunda, this question has a specific and
multi-layered agenda. First, it implies that Moore's removal was
somehow illegitimate. Second, it invites candidates to take a public
position opposing valid court orders and longstanding constitutional

185. There is a good argument that providing a full and substantive answer to this
question as presented (presuming that the answer is consistent with the LCV's positions)
puts a judicial candidate in the unfortunate position of having crossed the line from speech
to conduct-which is not afforded First Amendment protections, Butler and Weaver
notwithstanding.
186. LEDGER-ENQUIRER, supra note 178.
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precedent. Third, it implies that some specific course of action existed
that should have been taken by any judicial candidate. Finally, these
implications combine to pressure judicial candidates to take such action,
or at least to support the idea of taking it. Worthy of note here is that
fact that any such "action" might have risked contravening the orders of
the federal district court, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary, and the
Alabama Supreme Court.
This topic appeared in various forms throughout the LCV's questionnaire. Another example inquired:
6. If the special Supreme Court affirms the Court of the Judiciary's
decision to remove Roy Moore as chief justice, will you support efforts
to get Gov. Bob Riley to appoint Roy Moore as chief justice? Why or
why not? What will you actually do either way?' 87
Again, these might be regarded by otherwise disinterested members of
the public as questions of judicial administration, addressing how the
candidate would handle a case of judicial discipline and removal. And
again, use of such language as "will you support efforts to.. ." will not
only obtain an answer that implies a position on the merits of Moore's
case, but will pressure candidates to express support for or take specific
actions opposing removal and/or supporting reappointment by the
governor.
However, some questions that may produce covert signals are neither
so obvious nor even intentional-indeed, quite the opposite. The King
County Bar Association ("KCBA") questionnaire, 8 8 vetted by ABA
experts and designed to explore a judicial candidate's qualifications for
the position in a variety of contexts, is nonetheless a case in point. Two
categories of such questions, as classified by the KCBA questionnaire
itself, are explored below.
The following questions are taken from the category labeled "Knowledge"8 9 by the KCBA:
10. What criteria would you use for deciding whether to impose or
affirm sentences outside of standard ranges?

187. Id.
188. King County Bar Association, Sample Questionsfor JudicialCandidates,available
The
at http://www.kcba.org/judicial-ratings/pdf/sample-questionsjfor-candidates.pdf.
questionnaire differs from what the site terms "Questionnaire for Applicants," which is the
questionnaire used by the Judicial Screening Committee of the King County Bar
Association to evaluate applicants' employment history, professional expertise, and related
matters.
189. Id.
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19. Do you feel the War on Drugs has been effective or ineffective? 9
These two questions involve legitimate issues for public discussion-issues that are important in helping the public understand how
judicial decisions are made and why unpopular decisions may nonetheless be required by law. However, they also involve particularly
controversial topics in contemporary American jurisprudence: judicial
discretion in criminal sentencing and the validity of strict drug laws.
Answers to these questions, if not carefully drafted, thus may provide
fodder for partisans on either side of these substantive debates. They
may also provide interest groups with an opportunity to paint a
particular candidate as a "judicial activist" or a "strict constructionist,"
as tough on crime or as sentencing criminals to the proverbial slap on
the hand.
A second category in the KCBA questionnaire is labeled "Effectiveness,"'191 and encompasses case management and judicial philosophy:
9. Is it appropriate to impose more restrictions on what cases go to
trial? Is there a need for more mandatory mediation and settlement
efforts? What specifically do you propose to do about this, if elected?
11. What is your general judicial philosophy?
28. To what extent do you believe that
2 a judge should or should not

19
defer to the actions of a legislature?

The first question addresses court administration matters, including
caseload management and allocation of resources. However, the issues
listed also appear in so-called "tort reform" arguments. Providing a
response that exceeds the basic question or is carelessly drafted may
permit partisans on either side of the debate to co-opt the response for
inappropriate purposes. Depending on the answer given, litigants in
cases involving these issues may not have confidence in the judge's
impartiality.
The latter two questions address fundamental constitutional structure.
Members of the legal community have traditionally found public
discussions of judicial philosophy perfectly acceptable, even under the
restrictive clause guidelines. However, there is a substantial difference
between a discussion that explains canons of construction or a candidate's approach to handling cases and a discussion that consists of
publicly identifying oneself as a "strict constructionist" or "originalist"

190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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and criticizing "judicial activists." 93 As noted above, these labels are
readily identifiable code words that have become identified not only with
certain types of cases, but with specific decisions. Thus, identification
with such labels may tend to signal how a judicial candidate will decide
certain types of cases. In some contexts, use of such labels may extend
beyond signaling to be reasonably construed as a pledge, promise, or
commitment to particular decisional outcomes.
(3) Response Capacity
"Response capacity" refers to the format provided for answering a
questionnaire. Factors include predefined answer options; inclusion and
phrasing of a "decline to respond" option or prophylactic language;
whether space is provided for explaining answers; time allowed for
completion and submission; and public reporting methods. Each is
discussed in turn.
Predefined answer options are a common feature of judicial candidate
questionnaires. Examples include "yes"/"no," "support"/"oppose," and
"agree"/"disagree" formulations; since they accompany questions
formulated to serve the distributing group's agenda, neither the
questions nor either response is likely to be complete or fully accurate.
From an interest group's perspective, however, such limitations have two
major virtues: They conveniently force candidates to take what appears
to be a clear-cut position on an issue of importance to the group's
agenda, and they are easily reducible to sound bites that are useful in
promoting or opposing particular candidates (i.e., "Judge X supports
same-sex marriage" or "Judge Y opposes abortion").
A related factor in analyzing response capacity concerns "decline to
answer" options and other prophylactic language. Along with the usual
dichotomous answers, some questionnaires include a third option, which
may be labeled "decline to respond"--or, more insidiously, "refuse to
respond." On occasion, a questionnaire may include its own "disclaimers": for example, that the answers are provided pursuant to White, and
thus only to the extent permitted by applicable canons of conduct; or
that, because the candidate is committed to rendering decisions based on
each case's individual facts and applicable law, no response may be
construed as a pledge, promise, or commitment to a particular decisional
outcome. As a practical matter, such "disclaimers" are merely additional

193. In the past, I have explained this phenomenon in part by noting that no judicial
candidate ever ran for office by promising to be a "judicial activist." It has recently come
to my attention that there is one judge, who shall remain nameless, who has indeed done
so. Thanks, Judge, for spoiling my best argument here.
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examples of question-begging, and regardless of whether they provide
the desired prophylactic effect against disciplinary action, they are
unlikely to enhance public confidence in the judge's impartiality with
regard to such cases.
Such options may appear to provide an easy solution for judicial
candidates who feel that responding to particular questions would run
afoul of the "commit clause." In actuality, these options usually present
the candidate with the classic Hobson's choice: Ajudicial candidate who
inserts a check mark next to one of these options can be sure that, of all
of her answers, that one will be reported publicly. It is likely to be
reported in one of two ways, neither of which is helpful: At best, it will
consist of the "refused to respond" label, without further explanation;
worse, and perhaps more likely, it will be highlighted as an example of
the judicial candidate's alleged refusal to be accountable to the voters.
A third factor is the presence of "white space" for candidates to explain
or expand on their answers or to insert their own disclaimers. As noted
above, most questions are generally phrased in a way that renders
them-and any answer to them-incomplete, inaccurate, or both. A
questionnaire that is designed to achieve accuracy rather than partisan
sound bites should include plenty of white space for candidates to
amplify their answers and so ensure completeness and accuracy. Such
space should also be available so that candidates may insert their own
disclaimers: for example, a statement limiting an answer to the extent
permitted by the canons ofjudicial conduct; or a statement making clear
that, although the answer represents the candidate's personal opinion,
the candidate will render decisions based only on the facts and
applicable law of each individual case.
Fourth, judicial candidate questionnaires usually include extremely
short time frames in which candidates may complete and submit their
responses. This tactic serves two opposing but perhaps equally useful
objectives: It pressures candidates into either responding quickly, which
may induce them to be less circumspect in deciding whether and how to
answer, or causes them not to respond at all. Quick but careless
responses may, if only inadvertently, signal commitments to particular
decisional outcomes; they are thus useful both for supporting or opposing
particular candidates and for pressuring a judge, once elected, to rule
accordingly. Failure to respond entirely is likely to be reported publicly
as a refusal to respond, which permits interest groups to portray
candidates they oppose as unresponsive to the needs of voters and
unaccountable to the public they serve.
Finally, this practice of public reporting is itself a factor that
candidates must consider. For interest groups, no practical purpose is
served by disseminating a "confidential" questionnaire. Regardless of
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how the group characterizes its plan to use the responses, judicial
candidates should assume that they will be reported publicly in some
form; in all likelihood, responses will be distributed to the group's
members and constituents, the general public, and the media. Such
reporting frequently takes the form of a "voter guide" or a "scorecard"
rating candidates by how "friendly" they are to the group's agenda;
answers that are regarded as especially useful in supporting or opposing
particular candidates are likely to be trumpeted in press releases and
other media contacts. How judicial candidates should handle issues of
response capacity are addressed in the ensuing sections.
b. Step Tho: Calibratethe Response Carefully
After evaluating each question in light of the foregoing cautionary
measures, judicial candidates must balance completeness of their
responses with limitations on pledges, promises, or commitments;
aspirational standards of speech and conduct; and the requirements of
their oath to uphold the Constitution and the rule of law. Striking the
correct balance will often preclude a full and substantive answer to a
question as it is presented. However, judicial candidates should not
permit this to deter them from submitting any response at all.
In practical terms, judicial candidates may find that accurate
responses will nearly always include three elements: (1) a summary of
the applicable restrictions on pledges, promises, or commitments; (2) an
explanation of the reasons for such restrictions and the compelling
interest they serve; and (3) a conversion of the answer into an opportunity for public education. With regard to the third element, PPWPAF's
question on mandatory waiting periods for women seeking abortion
services provides a case in point. Distilled from its throat-clearing
"spin," the question itself consists only of the following:
Do you oppose the restrictions that require a mandatory 24-hour delay
and a state-mandated
lecture prior to having an abortion? __ Yes
9
No1 '
__
A correctly-balanced response to this question might'include an explanation that, under current law, whether to institute such waiting periods
is a matter for the legislature; that the function of the courts in such
cases will be limited to ensuring that the law is drafted and applied
according to the requirements of the Constitution and the rule of law; a
plain-English summary of the guidelines judges are required to consider
in determining whether laws of this type pass constitutional muster; and

194.

PPWPAF, supra note 176.
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that the candidate's job, if elected, will be to interpret and apply the law
accordingly, regardless of personal beliefs.
c. Step Three: Ignore CircumscribedResponses
Regardless of the prescribed format, circumscribed responses are likely
to be incomplete or inaccurate, and judicial candidates should not be
reluctant to ignore their limitations. Where the format permits nothing
more than a check mark next to "Yes" or "No," a candidate should simply
strike through the options provided and append a complete answer. If
there is insufficient space on the form, he may simply insert the phrase
"see attached," or words to like effect, and complete his answer on a
separate sheet. While many interest groups will publicly report such an
answer as "refused to respond," the candidate who responds in this
manner retains two advantages. First, by submitting a thoughtful and
careful response, he will be able to avoid criticism or censure for
signaling a pledge, promise, or commitment to a particular outcome.
Second, despite the fact that his answer is likely to be mischaracterized,
he will have proof of his actual answer, which may be released publicly
if he is attacked as unresponsive or unaccountable.
d. Step Four: Regard Each Questionnaire as an Opportunity
The final step is perhaps the most difficult, and yet perhaps the most
important: Judicial candidates must make the psychological shift
viewing questionnaires as threats and regarding them as opportunities.
The degree of difficulty should not be underestimated; it counters
decades of ethics tradition, as well as a natural reticence on the part of
many, if not most, judges in order to avoid compromising the judiciary's
impartiality, integrity, and independence. However, such a shift will
achieve important short- and long-term results for both the individual
candidate and the judiciary as a whole: It will help to reduce the
pressures of today's high-stakes judicial elections; and properly used for
public education, it will promote both the judicial independence
demanded by our system of government and the judicial accountability
demanded by the voting public.
3.

What Judicial CandidatesShould Answer

If judicial candidate questionnaires present an opportunity, they also
arguably present an obligation. In these days of sweeping public attacks
on individual judges and judicial independence generally, silence has
become a luxury that judicial candidates can no longer afford. As noted
above, the media already suspect judges of "hiding behind" the canons
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of judicial conduct to avoid discussing legitimate issues. Interest groups
are only too ready to fill that void. And most members of the public will
have little or no contact with judges and the court system, unless they
or their loved ones have a case in court, which virtually ensures that
their perceptions will be skewed by self-interest.
This lack of public education, coupled with the aggressive and
widespread presence of interest-group politics in judicial elections,
presents a good argument that judges and judicial candidates have an
affirmative duty to engage in certain activities: to help educate the
public; to promote judicial independence and accountability; and to set
and adhere to high ethical standards of conduct that promote the dignity
and integrity of the judiciary and the courts. Many judges are indeed
required, either by job description or by circumstance, to engage in
public commentary to the extent necessary to set the court system's
budget and to lobby for essential resources. Judges also are frequently
asked to teach, and to serve on speakers' bureaus for public education
programs in the schools, on forums and panels, or in conjunction with
Law Day and other law-related education activities. Such public
outreach is important, but insufficient.
Traditional approaches to judicial speech restrictions have long
permitted judges and judicial candidates to avoid discussing topics that
are not only legitimate, but necessary to informed voting decisions and
public understanding of the judicial system. Since White, much energy
has been expended by a few candidates and a great many interest
groups in pressuring judicial candidates to discuss issues of debatable
legitimacy, but little effort has been made to induce them to discuss
those issues that are most fundamental to the proper role and function
of the third branch. Indeed, judicial candidates arguably should not
wait for these issues to arise in the context of an interest-group
questionnaire or a reporter's query, but should raise them sua sponte at
appropriate opportunities. Following is a list of topics suitable for public
discussion by judicial candidates; it is by no means exhaustive, but
provides a substantial starting point:
- the role and function of the courts as a separate branch of government, including separation of powers and checks and balances;
* the role and function of the judge, including the standards
governing how judges interpret the law, apply rules, and reach
decisions;
• the canons of judicial conduct, including their purpose, the
function of and rationale for restrictions on speech and conduct, and
the differences between judges and other public officials that make
such restrictions necessary;
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* rules and their purposes, including the rules of evidence and
procedure, standing, and standards of review; how and why they
may compel unpopular or counterintuitive results, and why judges
are bound by them even when they disagree with the result;
- explanation of general substantive law195 of particular public
interest or relevance (such as the criminal law, custody and child
support laws, employment law, or the First Amendment and other
aspects of constitutional law) and how the Constitution, statutes,
court and procedural rules, and administrative regulations differ in
force and effect;
- administrative matters, including caseload management; court
budgets; court facilities; forms of assistance available for low-income
litigants; and the like; and
0 as noted above, lobbying and other activities to obtain the
resources necessary to permit the judiciary to perform its constitutional functions.
B.

Speak From the Bench

Finally, there is one option open to all sitting judges that few seem to
recognize: speaking directly from the bench. This solution's obviousness
perhaps explains the fact that it is so consistently overlooked. But
public comments that would validly raise eyebrows if made as part of a
judge's election campaign are often precisely the kinds of statements
that would evoke no adverse reaction if simply made from the bench.
Take, for example, the following hypothetical: An incumbent judge
presides over a defendant's trial and conviction for drunk driving. Our
defendant is a repeat offender, and this incident involved injury to a
local child. An interest group, outraged at what it regards as a toolenient sentence, launches a series of ads attacking the incumbent.
What the ads neglect to mention, of course, is that the judge sentenced
the defendant to the maximum allowed by law. They likewise neglect
to mention that turning the judge out of office will have absolutely no
effect on sentences given to future defendants in identical cases, because
it is the legislature, not the judge, who must amend the relevant statute
to provide for longer terms of incarceration.
Now suppose, in levying that sentence, the judge had made the
following statement:
Your conduct is reprehensible. If I could, I would sentence you to ten
years in prison. However, the Legislature sets the terms of sentencing

195. Such a discussion should, of course, occur outside the context of current or pending
cases.
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in these cases, and it has chosen to make two years the maximum
sentence for this particular offense. Thus, although I wish I could do
more, I am sentencing you to two years, the maximum allowable by
law.
Would anyone have been the least bit surprised by such comments?
More to the point, would anyone have been troubled by them? It's
unlikely, to say the least. And judges confront such situations every
day. They must avail themselves of such opportunities for two purposes:
to immunize themselves, at least in part, from inappropriate and
misleading attacks; and to educate the media and the public, when the
law mandates an unpopular result, about the reasons why.
This is not, of course, a recommendation that incumbent judges take
such opportunities as license to make any sort of public statement on
any issue whatsoever. As with every other aspect of the judicial
function, the use of judicial discretion-in both senses of the phrase-is
critical. But valid opportunities to speak from the bench do exist.
Judges should train themselves to recognize such opportunities when
they present themselves, and to take advantage of them in appropriate
ways.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Of course, as with any issue, the topics and methods outlined above
may be discussed in ways that signal pledges, promises, or commitments
to particular decisional outcomes, or otherwise violate the canons of
judicial conduct. However, making a habit of engaging in careful
discussion of such topics will help judicial candidates to become
comfortable with speaking publicly-which, in turn, will help them make
the psychological shift necessary to confronting and dealing appropriately with external pressures to engage in public commentary. And such
a shift is necessary if judicial candidates-and, indeed, the third branch
as a whole-are to navigate the fault lines of the post-White landscape
successfully.
Judicial candidates should also recognize that they are not alone in
facing these issues. An array of public and private organizations have
the expertise and resources to help judicial candidates navigate these
fault lines, and can put advisory opinions, memoranda, guidelines, and
handbooks at candidates' disposal. The National Center for State Courts
the National Ad Hoc Advisory
("NCSC") maintains two entities:
Committee on Judicial Election Law and the National Ad Hoc Advisory
Committee on Judicial Campaign Conduct, which provide a variety of
such resources. Many state and local bar associations and oversight
committees maintain telephone hotlines to field candidate questions and
fulfill a rapid-response function to apprise the media and the public of
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improper attacks. The American Bar Association provides toolkits to
help judicial candidates, and the ABA, the NCSC, and the National
Center for Courts and Media all maintain resources that can help
judicial candidates learn how to interact comfortably and appropriately
with reporters.
As noted at the outset, White has largely been regarded as a major
rupture in standards of judicial speech and conduct. While the steps
recommended here are far from easy, they are necessary if judicial
candidates are to adapt successfully to the new, post-White jurisprudence. For the moment, White appears to have subsided into a rift in
the landscape; these steps will go far toward preventing a new and
cataclysmic rupture. If, in the process, they lead to a judiciary that is
more robustly authoritative, autonomous, and accountable, White may
someday be regarded not as a catastrophe, but as an evolutionary step.

